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Abstract—We apply formal methods to lay and streamline
theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus on integrity and
DoS attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the
timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are threefold:
(1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs
and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of
cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we
formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on
a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success
chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions and results by
means of a non-trivial engineering application.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system security, formal methods,
theoretical foundation, process calculus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context and motivation: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are
integrations of networking and distributed computing systems
with physical processes that monitor and control entities in
a physical environment, with feedback loops where physical
processes affect computations and vice versa. For example, in
real-time control systems, a hierarchy of sensors, actuators
and control processing components are connected to control
stations. Different kinds of CPSs include supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA), programmable logic controllers
(PLC) and distributed control systems.
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of attacks to the security of cyber-physical and critical
systems, e.g., manipulating sensor readings and, in general,
influencing physical processes to bring the system into a state
desired by the attacker. Many (in)famous examples have been
so impressive to make the international news, e.g., the Stuxnet
worm, which reprogrammed PLCs of nuclear centrifuges
in Iran [6] or the attack on a sewage treatment facility in
Queensland, Australia, which manipulated the SCADA system
to release raw sewage into local rivers and parks [25].
As stated in [10], the concern for consequences at the phys-
ical level puts CPS security apart from standard information
security, and demands for ad hoc solutions to properly address
such novel research challenges. The works that have taken
up these challenges range from proposals of different notions
of cyber-physical security and attacks (e.g., [3], [10], [13],
to name a few) to pioneering extensions to CPS security of
standard formal approaches (e.g., [3], [4], [29]). However, to
the best of our knowledge, a systematic formal approach to
cyber-physical attacks is still to be fully developed.
Background: The dynamic behaviour of the physical plant
of a CPS is often represented by means of a discrete-time
state-space model1 consisting of two equations of the form
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk
yk = Cxk + ek
where xk ∈ Rn is the current (physical) state, uk ∈ Rm is the
input (i.e., the control actions implemented through actuators)
and yk ∈ Rp is the output (i.e., the measurements from the
sensors). The uncertainty wk ∈ Rn and the measurement error
ek ∈ Rp represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively,
and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the
physical system. Here, the next state xk+1 depends on the
current state xk and the corresponding control actions uk, at
the sampling instant k ∈ N. The state xk cannot be directly
observed: only its measurements yk can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network
through which the sensor measurements and actuator data are
exchanged with controller(s) and supervisor(s) (e.g., IDSs),
which are the cyber components (also called logics) of a CPS.
Contributions: In this paper, we focus on a formal treatment
of both integrity and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to physical
devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, paying particular
attention to the timing aspects of these attacks. The overall goal
of the paper is to apply formal methodologies to lay theoretical
foundations to reason about and statically detect attacks to
physical devices of CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of
these methodologies is for model-checking, in order to be
able to statically analyse security properties of CPSs before
their practical implementation and deployment. In other words,
we aim at providing an essential stepping stone for formal
and automated analysis techniques for checking the security
of CPSs (rather than for providing defence techniques).
Our contributions are threefold. The first contribution is
the definition of a hybrid process calculus, called CCPSA,
to formally specify both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks. In
CCPSA, CPSs have two components:
• a physical component denoting the physical plant (also
called environment) of the system, and containing infor-
mation on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution
law, etc., and
• a cyber component that governs access to sensors and
actuators, and channel-based communication with other
cyber components.
1See [31] for a taxonomy of the time-scale models used to represent CPSs.
Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber
components, whereas sensors and actuators make possible the
interaction between cyber and physical components.
CCPSA adopts a discrete notion of time [11] and it is
equipped with a labelled transition semantics (LTS) that allows
us to observe both physical events (system deadlock and
violations of safety conditions) and cyber events (channel
communications). Based on our LTS, we define two trace-
based system preorders: a trace preorder, v, and a timed
variant, vm..n, for m,n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, which takes into
account discrepancies of execution traces within the time
interval m..n. Intuitively, given two CPSs Sys1 and Sys2,
we write Sys1 vm..n Sys2 if Sys2 simulates the execution
traces of Sys1, except for the time interval m..n; if n = ∞
then the simulation only holds for the first m− 1 time slots.
As a second contribution, we formalise a threat model that
specifies attacks that can manipulate sensor and/or actuator
signals in order to drive a CPS into an undesired state [26].
Cyber-physical attacks typically tamper with both the physical
(sensors and actuators) and the cyber layer. In our threat model,
communication cannot be manipulated by the attacker, who
instead may compromise (unsecured) physical devices, which
is our focus. As depicted in Figure 1, our attacks may affect
directly the sensor measurements or the controller commands:
• Attacks on sensors consist of reading and eventually
replacing yk (the sensor measurements) with yak .
• Attacks on actuators consist of reading, dropping and
eventually replacing the controller commands uk with uak,
affecting directly the actions the actuators may execute.
We group attacks into classes. A class of attacks takes into
account both the malicious activities I on physical devices
and the timing parameters m and n of the attack: begin and
end of the attack. We represent a class C as a total function
C ∈ [I → P(m..n)]. Intuitively, for ι ∈ I, C(ι) ⊆ m..n
denotes the set of time instants when an attack of class C may
tamper with the device ι. Thus, a class C is a total function
that associates to any malicious use (read/write) of any physical
device (sensor/actuator) a possibly empty set of time instants
in which the attacker tampers with that specific device.
As observed in [13], timing is a critical issue in CPSs
because the physical state of a system changes continuously
over time and, as the system evolves in time, some states might
be more vulnerable to attacks than others. For example, an
attack launched when the target state variable reaches a local
maximum (or minimum) may have a great impact on the whole
system behaviour [14]. Furthermore, not only the timing of
the attack but also the duration of the attack is an important
parameter to be taken into consideration in order to achieve
a successful attack. For example, it may take minutes for a
chemical reactor to rupture [27], hours to heat a tank of water
or burn out a motor, and days to destroy centrifuges [6].
In order to make security assessments on our CPSs, we adopt
a well-known approach called Generalized Non Deducibility
on Composition (GNDC) [7]. Thus, in CCPSA, we say that a
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Fig. 1. Our threat model for CPSs
CPS Sys tolerates a cyber-physical attack A if
Sys ‖ A v Sys .
In this case, the presence of the attack A, does not affect
the whole (physical and logical) observable behaviour of the
system Sys , and the attack can be considered harmless.
On the other hand, we say that a CPS Sys is vulnerable
to a cyber-physical attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if
there is a time interval m′..n′ in which the attack becomes
observable (obviously, m′ ≥ m). Formally, we write:
Sys ‖ A vm′..n′ Sys .
We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack toler-
ance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C. We define
a notion of most powerful attack of a given class C, Top(C),
and prove that if a CPS tolerates Top(C) then it tolerates
all attacks A of class C. Similarly, if a CPS is vulnerable to
Top(C), in the time interval m′..n′, then no attacks of class
C can affect the system out of that time interval. This is very
useful when checking for attack tolerance/vulnerability with
respect to all attacks of a given class C.
As a third contribution, we formalise how to estimate the
impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the chances for an attack of being successful
when attacking a CPS. This is important since, in industrial
CPSs, before taking any countermeasure against an attack,
engineers typically first try to estimate the impact of the attack
on the system functioning (e.g., performance and security) and
weigh it against the cost of stopping the plant. If this cost is
higher than the damage caused by the attack (as is sometimes
the case), then engineers might actually decide to let the system
continue its activities even under attack. We thus provide a
metric to estimate the deviation of the system under attack
with respect to expected behaviour, according to its evolution
law and the uncertainty of the model. Then, we prove that
the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an
upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C.
We introduce a non-trivial running example taken from an
engineering application and use it to illustrate our definitions
and cases of CPSs that tolerate certain attacks, and of CPSs
that suffer from attacks that drag them towards undesired
behaviours. We remark that while we have kept the example
simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to describe
a wide number of attacks, as will become clear below.
All the results presented in the paper have been formally
proven; due to lack of space, proofs have been sketched or
omitted and full details can be found in [16]. Moreover, the
behaviour of our running example and of most of the cyber-
physical attacks appearing in the paper have been simulated in
MATLAB.
Organisation: In § II, we give syntax and semantics of
CCPSA. In § III, we define cyber-physical attacks and provide
sufficient criteria for attack tolerance/vulnerability. In § IV,
we estimate the impact of attacks on CPSs, and investigate
possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack. In
§ V, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
II. THE CALCULUS
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical
Systems and Attacks, CCPSA, which extends the Calculus of
Cyber-Physical Systems, defined in our companion paper [15],
with specific features to formalise and study attacks to physical
devices. Let us start with some preliminary notations.
Notation 1. We use x, xk ∈ X for state variables, c, d ∈ C
for communication channels, a, ak ∈ A for actuator devices,
s, sk ∈ S for sensors devices, and p, q for both sensors and
actuators (generically called physical devices). Values, ranged
over by v, v′ ∈ V , are built from basic values, such as Booleans,
integers and real numbers. State variables are metavariables for
physical properties like temperature, pressure, etc. Actuator
names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve , light ,
etc. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for sensor
devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer .
Given a set of names N , we write RN to denote the set
of functions [N → R] assigning a real to each name in N .
For ξ ∈ RN , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ[n 7→ v] for the
function ψ ∈ RN such that ψ(m) = ξ(m), for any m 6= n,
and ψ(n) = v.
Finally, we distinguish between real intervals, such as (m,n],
for m ∈ R and n ∈ R ∪ {∞}, and integer intervals, written
m..n, for m ∈ N and n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. As we will adopt a
discrete notion of time, we will use integer intervals to denote
time intervals.
Definition 1 (Cyber-physical system). In CCPSA, a cyber-
physical system consists of two components:
• a physical environment E that encloses all physical
aspects of a system (state variables, physical devices,
evolution law, etc.) and
• a cyber component P that interacts with sensors and
actuators of the system, and can communicate, via
channels, with other cyber components of the same or of
other CPSs.
Given a set S of secured physical devices of E, we write
EonS P to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to
range over CPSs. We write EonP when S = ∅.
In a CPS EonS P , the “secured” devices in S are accessed
in a protected way and hence they cannot be attacked.2
2The presence of battery-powered devices interconnected through wireless
networks prevents the en-/decryption of all packets due to energy constraints.
Let us now define physical environments E and cyber
components P in order to formalise our proposal for modelling
(and reasoning about) CPSs and cyber-physical attacks.
Definition 2 (Physical environment). Let Xˆ ⊆ X be a set
of state variables, Aˆ ⊆ A be a set of actuators, and Sˆ ⊆ S
be a set of sensors. A physical environment E is an 8-tuple
〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, where:
• ξx ∈ RXˆ is the state function,
• ξu ∈ RAˆ is the actuator function,
• ξw ∈ RXˆ is the uncertainty function,
• evol : RXˆ × RAˆ × RXˆ → 2RXˆ is the evolution map,
• ξe ∈ RSˆ is the sensor-error function,
• meas : RXˆ × RSˆ → 2RSˆ is the measurement map,
• inv : RXˆ → {true, false} is the invariant function,
• safe : RXˆ → {true, false} is the safety function.
All the functions defining an environment are total functions.
The state function ξx returns the current value (in R)
associated to each state variable of the system. The actuator
function ξu returns the current value associated to each actuator.
The uncertainty function ξw returns the uncertainty associated
to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈ Xˆ , ξw(x)
returns the maximum distance between the real value of x and
its representation in the model. Later in the paper, we will be
interested in comparing the accuracy of two systems. Thus, for
ξw, ξ
′
w ∈ RXˆ , we will write ξw ≤ ξ′w if ξw(x) ≤ ξ′w(x), for
any x ∈ Xˆ . Similarly, we write ξw+ ξ′w to denote the function
ξ′′w ∈ RXˆ such that ξ′′w(x) = ξw(x) + ξ′w(x), for any x ∈ Xˆ .
Given a state function, an actuator function, and an un-
certainty function, the evolution map evol returns the set of
next admissible state functions. It models the evolution law of
the physical system, where changes made on actuators may
reflect on state variables. Since we assume an uncertainty in
our models, evol does not return a single state function but
a set of possible state functions. evol is obviously monotone
with respect to uncertainty: if ξw ≤ ξ′w then evol(ξx, ξu, ξw) ⊆
evol(ξx, ξu, ξ
′
w).
Both the state function and the actuator function are supposed
to change during the evolution of the system, whereas the
uncertainty function is constant.3
The sensor-error function ξe returns the maximum error
associated to each sensor in Sˆ. Again due to the presence of
the sensor-error function, the measurement map meas , given the
current state function, returns a set of admissible measurement
functions rather than a single one.
The invariant function inv represents the conditions that the
state variables must satisfy to allow for the evolution of the
system. A CPS whose state variables don’t satisfy the invariant
is in deadlock.
The safety function safe represents the conditions that the
state variables must satisfy to consider the CPS in a safe state.
3Note that, although the uncertainty function is constant, it can be used in
the evolution map in an arbitrary way (e.g., it could have a heavier weight
when a state variable reaches extreme values). Another possibility is to model
the uncertainty function by means of a probability distribution.
Intuitively, if a CPS gets in an unsafe state, then its functionality
may get compromised.
In the following, we use a specific notation for the re-
placement of a single component of an environment with
a new one of the same kind; for instance, for E =
〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, we write E[ξw ← ξ′w]
to denote 〈ξx, ξu, ξ′w, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉.
Let us now introduce a running example to illustrate our
approach. We remark that while we have kept the example
simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to describe a
wide number of attacks. A more complex example (say, with n
sensors and m actuators) wouldn’t have been more instructive
but just made the paper more dense.
Example 1 (Physical environment of the CPS Sys). Consider a
CPS Sys in which the temperature of an engine is maintained
within a specific range by means of a cooling system. The
physical environment Env of Sys is constituted by: (i) a state
variable temp containing the current temperature of the engine,
and a state variable stress keeping track of the level of stress
of the mechanical parts of the engine due to high temperatures
(exceeding 9.9 degrees); this integer variable ranges from 0,
meaning no stress, to 5, for high stress; (ii) an actuator cool
to turn on/off the cooling system; (iii) a sensor st (such as a
thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature
of the engine; (iv) an uncertainty δ = 0.4 associated to the
only variable temp; (v) the evolution law for the two state
variables: the variable temp is increased (resp., is decreased)
of one degree per time unit if the cooling system is inactive
(resp., active), whereas the variable stress contains an integer
that is increased each time the current temperature is above
9.9 degrees, and dropped to 0 otherwise; (vi) an error  = 0.1
associated to the only sensor st; (vii) a measurement map to
get the values detected by sensor st, up to its error ; (viii) an
invariant function saying that the system gets faulty when the
temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 50]; (ix) a
safety function to say that the system moves to an unsafe state
when the level of stress reaches the threshold 5.
Formally, Env = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉 with:
• ξx ∈ R{temp,stress} and ξx(temp) = 0 and ξx(stress)=0;
• ξu ∈ R{cool} and ξu(cool) = off; for the sake of simplicity,
we can assume ξu to be a mapping {cool} → {on, off}
such that ξu(cool) = off if ξu(cool) ≥ 0, and ξu(cool) =
on if ξu(cool) < 0;
• ξw∈R{temp,stress}, ξw(temp)=0.4=δ and ξw(stress)=0;
• evol(ξix, ξ
i
u, ξw) is the set of ξ ∈ R{temp,stress} such that:
– ξ(temp) = ξix(temp) + heat(ξiu, cool) + γ, with γ ∈
[−δ,+δ] and heat(ξiu, cool) = −1 if ξiu(cool) = on
(active cooling), and heat(ξiu, cool) = +1 if ξ
i
u(cool) =
off (inactive cooling);
– ξ(stress) = min(5 , ξix(stress)+1) if ξix(temp) > 9.9;
ξ(stress) = 0, otherwise;
• ξe ∈ R{st} and ξe(st) = 0.1 = ;
• meas(ξix, ξe)=
{
ξ : ξ(st)∈[ξix(temp)− , ξix(temp)+]
}
;
• inv(ξx) = true if 0 ≤ ξx(temp) ≤ 50; inv(ξx) = false,
otherwise.
• safe(ξx) = true if ξx(stress) < 5; safe(ξx) = false, if
ξx(stress) ≥ 5 (the maximum value for stress is 5).
Let us now formalise the cyber component of CPSs in
CCPSA. Basically, we extend the timed process algebra TPL
of [11] with two main ingredients:
• two different constructs to read values detected at sensors
and write values on actuators, respectively;
• special constructs to represent malicious activities on
physical devices.
The remaining constructs are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 3 (Processes). Processes are defined as follows:
P,Q ::= nil
∣∣ idle.P ∣∣ P ‖ Q ∣∣ timeoutbpi.P cQ ∣∣
if (b) {P} else {Q} ∣∣ P\c ∣∣ H〈w˜〉
pi ::= snd c〈v〉 ∣∣ rcv c(x) ∣∣ read s(x) ∣∣
write a〈v〉 ∣∣ read Ep(x) ∣∣ write Ep〈v〉 .
We write nil for the terminated process. The process
idle.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P .
We write P ‖ Q to denote the parallel composition of
concurrent threadsP and Q. The process timeoutbpi.P cQ
denotes prefixing with timeout. Thus, timeoutbsnd c〈v〉.P cQ
sends the value v on channel c and, after that, it continues as P ;
otherwise, after one time unit, it evolves into Q. The process
timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ is the obvious counterpart for reception.
The process timeoutbread s(x).P cQ reads the values detected
by the sensor s, whereas timeoutbwrite a〈v〉.P cQ writes
on the actuator a. For pi ∈ {read Ep(x),write Ep〈v〉}, the
process timeoutbpi.P cQ denotes the reading and the writing,
respectively, of the physical device p (sensor or actuator) made
by the attack. Thus, in CCPSA, attack processes have specific
constructs to interact with physical devices.
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS.
It is quantified over the set C of communication channels but we
sometimes write P\{c1, c2, . . . , cn} to mean P\c1\c2 · · · \cn.
The process if (b) {P} else {Q} is the standard conditional,
where b is a decidable guard. In processes of the form idle.Q
and timeoutbpi.P cQ, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-
guarded. The process H〈w˜〉 denotes (guarded) recursion.
We assume a set of process identifiers ranged over by
H,H1, H2. We write H〈w1, . . . , wk〉 to denote a recursive
process H defined via an equation H(x1, . . . , xk) = P , where
(i) the tuple x1, . . . , xk contains all the variables that appear
free in P , and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the
process identifiers, such as H itself. We say that recursion is
time-guarded if P contains only time-guarded occurrences of
the process identifiers. Unless explicitly stated our recursive
processes are always time-guarded.
In the two constructs timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ and
timeoutbreadµ(x).P cQ, with µ ∈ {p, Ep}, the variable
x is said to be bound. This gives rise to the standard notions
of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. A term is
closed if it does not contain free variables, and we assume
to always work with closed processes: the absence of free
variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we
write T{v/x} for the substitution of all occurrences of the free
variable x in T with the value v.
Note that in CCPSA, a processes might use sensors and/or
actuators which are not defined in the environment. To rule
out ill-formed CPSs, we use the following definition.
Definition 4 (Well-formedness). Given a process P and an
environment E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, the
CPS EonP is well-formed if: (i) for any sensor s mentioned
in P , the function ξe is defined on s; (ii) for any actuator a
mentioned in P , the function ξu is defined on a.
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed CPSs.
Notation 2. To model time-persistent prefixing, we write
pi.P for the process defined via the equation Rcv =
timeoutbpi.P cRcv , where Rcv does not occur in P . Further,
we write
• timeoutbpicQ as an abbreviation for timeoutbpi.nilcQ,
• timeoutbpi.P c as an abbreviation for timeoutbpi.P cnil,
• snd c and rcv c, when channel c is used for pure synchro-
nisation,
• idlek.P as a shorthand for idle.idle. . . . idle.P , where the
prefix idle appears k ≥ 0 consecutive times,
• if (b) {P} instead of if (b) {P} else {nil}.
Let M = EonS P , we write M ‖ Q for EonS (P ‖ Q), and
M\c for EonS (P\c).
We can now finalise our running example.
Example 2 (Cyber component of the CPS Sys). Let us
define the cyber component of the CPS Sys described in
Example 1. We define two parallel processes: Ctrl and
IDS . The former models the controller activity, consisting in
reading the temperature sensor and in governing the cooling
system via its actuator, whereas the latter models a simple
intrusion detection system that attempts to detect and signal
abnormal behaviours of the system. Intuitively, Ctrl senses the
temperature of the engine at each time slot. When the sensed
temperature is above 10 degrees, the controller activates the
coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive
time units. After that time, the controller synchronises with the
IDS component via a private channel sync, and then waits for
instructions, via a channel ins . The IDS component checks
whether the sensed temperature is still above 10. If this is the
case, it sends an alarm of “high temperature”, via a specific
channel, and then says to Ctrl to keep cooling for other 5
time units; otherwise, if the temperature is not above 10, the
IDS component requires Ctrl to stop the cooling activity.
Ctrl = read st(x).if (x > 10) {Cooling} else {idle.Ctrl}
Cooling = write cool〈on〉.idle5.Check
Check = snd sync.rcv ins(y).if (y = keep_cooling)
{idle5.Check} else {write cool〈off〉.idle.Ctrl}
IDS = rcv sync.read st(x).if (x > 10)
{snd alarm〈high_temp〉.snd ins〈keep_cooling〉.
idle.IDS} else {snd ins〈stop〉.idle.IDS} .
Thus, the whole CPS is defined as:
Sys = Env on (Ctrl ‖ IDS )\{sync, ins} ,
time
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Fig. 2. Three possible evolutions of the CPS of Example 2.
where Env is the physical environment defined in Example 1.
We remark that, for the sake of simplicity, our IDS component
is quite basic: for instance, it does not check whether the
temperature is too low. However, it is straightforward to replace
it with a more sophisticated one, containing more informative
tests on sensor values and/or on actuators commands.
A. Labelled transition semantics
In this subsection, we provide the dynamics of CCPSA in
terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the SOS style
of Plotkin. Definition 5 introduces auxiliary operators on envi-
ronments.
Definition 5. Let E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉.
• read_sensor(E, s) def= {ξ(s) : ξ ∈ meas(ξx, ξe)},
• update_act(E, a, v) def= E[ξu ← ξu[a 7→ v]],
• next(E) def=
⋃
ξ∈evol(ξx,ξu,ξw){E[ξx ← ξ]},
• inv(E) def= inv(ξx),
• safe(E) def= safe(ξx).
The operator read_sensor(E, s) returns the set of possible
measurements detected by sensor s in the environment E; due
to the error ξe(s) of sensor s, it returns a set of possible values
rather than a single value. update_act(E, a, v) returns the new
environment in which the actuator function is updated in such
a manner to associate the actuator a with the value v. next(E)
returns the set of the next admissible environments reachable
from E, by an application of evol . inv(E) checks whether
the invariant is satisfied by the current values of the state
variables (here, abusing notation, we overload the meaning of
the function inv ). safe(E) checks whether the safety conditions
are satisfied by the current values of the state variables.
In Table I, we provide transition rules for processes. Here,
the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {idle, τ, cv, cv,
a!v, s?v, Ep!v, Ep?v, τ :p}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve
to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rules
(Write) and (Read) denote the writing/reading of some data on
the physical device p. Rule (ESensWrite E) models an integrity
TABLE I
LTS FOR PROCESSES
(Outp)
−
timeoutbsnd c〈v〉.P cQ cv−−−→ P
(Inpp)
−
timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ cv−−−→ P{v/x}
(Com) P
cv−−−→ P ′ Q cv−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Par)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6= idle
P ‖ Q λ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q
(Write)
µ ∈ {p, Ep}
timeoutbwriteµ〈v〉.P cQ µ!v−−−−→ P
(Read)
µ ∈ {p, Ep}
timeoutbreadµ(x).P cQ µ?v−−−−→ P{v/x}
(ESensWrite E) P
Es!v−−−−→ P ′ Q s?v−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ :s−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(EActRead E) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ Q Ea?v−−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ :a−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Res)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6∈ {cv, cv}
P\c λ−−→ P ′\c
(Rec)
P{w˜/˜x} λ−−→ Q H(x˜) = P
H〈w˜〉 λ−−→ Q
(Then)
JbK = true P λ−−→ P ′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ P ′
(Else)
JbK = false Q λ−−→ Q′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ Q′
(TimeNil)
−
nil
idle−−−→ nil
(Delay)
−
idle.P
idle−−−→ P
(Timeout)
−
timeoutbpi.P cQ idle−−−→ Q
(TimePar)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ Q idle−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q idle−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
attack on sensor s, where the controller of s is supplied with a
fake value v provided by the attack. Rule (EActRead E) models
a DoS attack to the actuator a, where the update request of the
controller is intercepted by the attacker and it never reaches the
actuator. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel
components. Rules (Res), (Rec), (Then) and (Else) are standard.
The following four rules model the passage of time. The
symmetric counterparts of rules (Com) and (Par) are omitted.
In Table II, we lift the transition rules from processes to
systems. Except for rule (Deadlock), all rules have a common
premise inv(E): a system can evolve only if the invariant
is satisfied. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the
set {τ, cv, cv, idle, deadlock, unsafe}. These actions denote:
internal activities (τ ); logical activities, more precisely, channel
transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (idle); and two
specific physical events: system deadlock (deadlock) and the
violation of the safety conditions (unsafe). Rules (Out) and (Inp)
model transmission and reception, with an external system,
on a channel c. Rule (SensReadSec) models the reading of
the current data detected at a secured sensor s, whereas rule
(SensReadUnsec) models the reading of an unsecured sensor s.
In this case, since the sensor is not secured, the presence of a
malicious action Es!w prevents the reading of the sensor. We
already said that rule (ESensWrite E) of Table I models integrity
attacks on an unsecured sensor s, however, together with rule
(SensReadUnsec), it also serves to model DoS attacks on an
unsecured sensor s, as the controller of s cannot read its correct
value if the attacker is currently supplying a fake value for it.
Rule (ESensRead E) allows the attacker to read the confidential
value detected at an unsecured sensor s. Rule (ActWriteSec)
models the writing of a value v on a secured actuator a,
whereas rule (ActWriteUnsec) models the writing on an un-
secured actuator a. Again, if the actuator is unsecured, the
presence of an attack (capable of performing an action Ea?v)
prevents the correct access to the actuator by the controller. Rule
(EActWrite E) models an integrity attack to an unsecured actua-
tor a, where the attack updates the actuator with a fake value.
Note that our operational semantics ensures a preemptive
power to prefixes of the form write Ep〈v〉 and read Ep(x) on
unsecured devices p. This because an attack process can always
prevent the regular access to a unsecured physical device
(sensor or actuator) by its controller.
Proposition 1 (Attack preemptiveness). Let M = EonS P .
• If there is Q such that P
Es!v−−−−→ Q, with s 6∈ S, then
there is no M ′ such that M
τ−−→ M ′ by an application
of the rule (SensReadUnsec).
• If there is Q such that P
Ea?v−−−−→ Q, with a 6∈ S, then
there is no M ′ such that M
τ−−→ M ′ by an application
of the rule (ActWriteUnsec).
Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to
systems. This includes communications channels and attacks’
accesses to unsecured physical devices. A similar lifting occurs
in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E) returns the set
of possible environments for the next time slot. Thus, by an
application of rule (Time) a CPS moves to the next physical
state, in the next time slot. Rule (Deadlock) is introduced to
signal the violation of the invariant. When the invariant is
violated, a system deadlock occurs and then, in CCPSA, the
TABLE II
LTS FOR CPSS
(Out)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonS P
cv−−−→ EonS P ′
(Inp)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonS P
cv−−−→ EonS P ′
(SensReadSec) P
s?v−−−−→ P ′ s ∈ S inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(SensReadUnsec) P
s?v−−−−→ P ′ s 6∈ S P Es!v−−−−→6 inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(ESensRead E) P
Es?v−−−−→ P ′ s 6∈ S inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(ActWriteSec) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ a ∈ S inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′ onS P ′
(ActWriteUnsec) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ a 6∈ S P Ea?v−−−−−→6 inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′ onS P ′
(EActWrite E) P
Ea!v−−−−→ P ′ a 6∈ S inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′ onS P ′
(Tau)
(P
τ−−→ P ′) ∨ (P τ :p−−−→ P ′ p 6∈ S) inv(E)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(Deadlock)
¬ inv(E)
EonS P
deadlock−−−−−−−→ EonS P
(Time)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ EonS P τ−−→6 inv(E) E′ ∈ next(E)
EonS P
idle−−−→ E′ onS P ′
(Safety)
¬ safe(E) inv(E)
EonS P
unsafe−−−−−→ EonS P
system emits a special action deadlock, forever. Similarly,
rule (Safety) is introduced to detect the violation of safety
conditions. In this case, the system may emit a special action
unsafe and then continue its evolution.
Now, having defined the actions that can be performed by
a system, we can easily concatenate these actions to define
the possible execution traces of the system. Formally, given
a trace t = α1 . . . αn, we will write
t−−→ as an abbreviation
for
α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→. In the following, we will use the function
#idle(t) to get the number of occurrences of the action idle in t.
The notion of trace allows us to provide a formal definition
of soundness for CPSs: a CPS is said to be sound if it never
deadlocks and never violates the safety conditions.
Definition 6 (System soundness). Let M be a well-formed
CPS. We say that M is sound if whenever M
t−−→ M ′, for
some t, both actions deadlock and unsafe never occur in t.
In our security analysis, we will focus on sound CPSs. For
instance, Proposition 2 says that our running example Sys is
sound and it never transmits on the channel alarm .
Proposition 2. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2. If
Sys
t−−→ Sys ′, for some trace t=α1 . . . αn, then αi ∈ {τ, idle},
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached
by Sys before and after the cooling: in each of the 5 rounds
of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value laying in the
real interval [1−δ, 1+δ], where δ is the uncertainty.
Proposition 3. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2. For
any execution trace of Sys , we have:
• when Sys turns on the cooling, the value of the state
variable temp ranges over (9.9 , 11.5];
• when Sys turns off the cooling, the value of the variable
temp ranges over (2.9, 8.5].
The graphic in Figure 3 collects a campaign of 100
simulations, lasting 250 time slots each, showing that the value
of the state variable temp when the cooling system is turned
on (resp., off) lays in the interval (9.9, 11.5] (resp., (2.9, 8.5]);
these bounds are represented by the dashed horizontal lines.
B. Behavioural semantics
We recall that the observable activities in CCPSA are: time
passing, system deadlock, violation of safety conditions, and
channel communication. Having defined a labelled transition
semantics, we are ready to formalise our behavioural semantics,
based on execution traces.
We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: we write
=⇒ for ( τ−−→)∗, whereas α==⇒ means =⇒ α−−→=⇒, and finally
αˆ
=⇒ denotes =⇒ if α = τ and α=⇒ otherwise. Given a trace
t = α1. . .αn, we write
t−−→ for α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→, and tˆ==⇒ as
an abbreviation for α̂1===⇒ . . . α̂n===⇒.
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Fig. 3. Simulations of the CPS of Example 2
Definition 7 (Trace preorder). We write M v N if whenever
M
t−−→M ′, for some t, there is N ′ such that N tˆ==⇒ N ′.
Remark 1. Unlike standard trace semantics, our trace preorder
is able to observe deadlock thanks to the presence of the rule
(Deadlock) and the special action deadlock: if M v N and M
eventually deadlocks then also N must eventually deadlock.
As we are interested in examining timing aspects of attacks,
such as beginning and duration, we propose a timed variant of
v up to (a possibly infinite) time interval. Intuitively, we write
M vm..n N if the CPS N simulates the execution traces of
M , except for the time interval m..n.
Definition 8 (Trace preorder up to a time interval). We write
M vm..n N , for m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with m ≤ n,
if the following conditions hold:
• m is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t,
with #idle(t) = m− 1, such that M t−−→ and N 6 tˆ==⇒;
• n is the infimum element of N+ ∪{∞}, n ≥ m, such that
whenever M
t1−−→M ′, with #idle(t1) = n− 1, there is
t2, with #idle(t1) = #idle(t2), such that N
t2−−→ N ′, for
some N ′, and M ′ v N ′.
In Definition 8, the first item says that N can simulate
the traces of M for at most m − 1 time slots; whereas the
second item says two things: (i) in time interval m..n the
simulation does not hold; (ii) after the time slot n the CPS
N can simulate again the traces of M . Note that inf(∅) =∞.
Thus, if M vm..∞ N then N simulates M only in the first
m− 1 time slots.
Finally, note that we could have equipped CCPSA with a
(bi)simulation-based behavioural semantics rather than a trace-
based one, as done in our companion paper [15] for a core of
CCPSA with no security features; however, our trace semantics
is simpler than (bi)simulation and it is sensitive to deadlocks
of CPSs. Thus, it is fully adequate for the purposes of this
paper.
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we use CCPSA to formalise a threat model
where attacks can manipulate sensor and/or actuator signals in
order to drive a sound CPS into an undesired state [26]. An
attack may have different levels of access to physical devices
depending on the model assumed. For example, it might be
able to get read access to the sensors but not write access; or it
might get write-only access to the actuators but not read-access.
This level of granularity is very important to model precisely
how attacks can affect a CPS [4]. For simplicity, in this paper
we don’t represent attacks on communication channels as our
focus is on attacks to physical devices.
The syntax of our cyber-physical attack is a slight restriction
of that for processes: in terms of the form timeoutbpi.P cQ,
we require pi ∈ {write Ep〈v〉, read Ep(x)}. Thus, we provide a
syntactic way to distinguish attacks from genuine processes.
Definition 9 (Honest system). A CPS EonS P is honest if P
is honest, where P is honest if it does not contain prefixes of
the form write Ep〈v〉 or read Ep(x).
We group cyber-physical attacks in classes that describe
both the malicious activities and the timing aspects of the
attack. Intuitively, a class of attacks provides information about
which physical devices are accessed by the attacks of that class,
how they are accessed (read and/or write), when the attack
begins and when the attack ends. Thus, let I be the set of
all possible malicious activities on the physical devices of a
system, m ∈ N+ be the time slot when an attack starts, and
n ∈ N+∪{∞} be the time slot when the attack ends. We then
say that an attack A is of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if:
• all possible malicious activities of A coincide with those
contained in I;
• the first of those actions may occur in the m-th time slot
(A admits a run acting at time m) but not before;
• the last of those actions may occur in the n-th time slot
(A admits a run acting at time n) but not after;
• for ι ∈ I, C(ι) returns a (possibly empty) set of time
slots when A may read/tamper with the device ι; this set
is contained in m..n;
• C is a total function: if C(ι) = ∅, for some ι ∈ I, then
no attacks of class C can achieve the malicious activity ι.
Definition 10 (Class of attacks). Let I = {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪
A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A} be the set of all possible malicious
activities on physical devices. Let m ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞},
with m ≤ n. A class of attacks C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] is a total
function such that for any attack A of class C we have:
(i) C(ι) = {k : A t−−→ ιv−−→ A′ ∧ k = #idle(t) + 1}, for
ι ∈ I,
(ii) m = inf{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I },
(iii) n = sup{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I }.
Along the lines of [7], [18], we can say that an attack A
affects a sound CPS M if the execution of the composed
system M ‖ A differs from that of the original system M ,
in an observable manner. Basically, a cyber-physical attack
can influence the system under attack in at least two different
ways:
• The system M ‖ A might deadlock when M may not;
this means that the attack A affects the availability of the
system. We recall that in the context of CPSs, deadlock
is a particular severe physical event.
• The system M ‖ A might have non-genuine execution
traces containing observables (violations of safety con-
ditions or communications on channels) that cannot be
reproduced by M ; here the attack affects the integrity of
the system behaviour.
Definition 11 (Attack tolerance/vulnerability). Let M be an
honest and sound CPS. We say that M is tolerant to an attack A
if M ‖ A v M . We say that M is vulnerable to an attack A if
there is a time interval m..n, with m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+∪{∞},
such that M ‖ A vm..n M .
Thus, if a system M is vulnerable to an attack A of class
C ∈ [I → P(m..n)], during the time interval m′..n′, then
the attack operates during the interval m..n but it influences
the system under attack in the time interval m′..n′ (obviously,
m′ ≥ m). If n′ is finite we have a temporary attack, otherwise
we have a permanent attack. Furthermore, if m′ − n is big
enough and n − m is small, then we have a quick nasty
attack that affects the system late enough to allow attack
camouflages [10]. On the other hand, if m′ is significantly
smaller than n, then the attack affects the observable behaviour
of the system well before its termination and the CPS has good
chances of undertaking countermeasures to stop the attack.
Finally, if M ‖ A t−−→ deadlock−−−−−−−→, for some trace t, the attack
A is called lethal, as it is capable to halt (deadlock) the CPS
M . This is obviously a permanent attack.
Note that, according to Definition 11, the tolerance (or
vulnerability) of a CPS also depends on the capability of
the IDS component to detect and signal undesired physical
behaviours. In fact, the IDS component might be designed to
detect abnormal physical behaviours going well further than
deadlocks and violations of safety conditions.
In the following, we say that an attack is stealthy if it is able
to drive the CPS under attack into an incorrect physical state
(either deadlock or violation of the safety conditions) without
being noticed by the IDS component.
In the rest of this section, we present a number of different
attacks to the CPS Sys described in Example 2.
Example 3. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack on the
(controller of) the actuator cool , of class C ∈ [I → P(m..m)]
with C(Ecool?) = C(Ecool!) = {m} and C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈
{Ecool?, Ecool!}; we call the attack Am:
idlem−1.timeoutbread Ecool(x).if(x=off){write Ecool〈off〉}c.
Here, the attack Am operates exclusively in the m-th time
slot, when it tries to steal the cooling command (on or off)
coming from the controller, and fabricates a fake command
to turn off the cooling system. In practice, if the controller
sends a command to turn off the coolant, nothing bad will
happen as the attack will put the same message back. When
the controller sends (in the m-th time slot) a command to
turn the cooling on, the attack will drop the command. We
recall that the controller will turn on the cooling only if the
sensed temperature is greater than 10 (and hence temp > 9.9);
this may happen only if m > 8. Since the command to turn
the cooling on is never re-sent by Ctrl , the temperature will
continue to rise, and after 4 time units the system will violate
the safety conditions emitting an action unsafe, while the IDS
component will start sending alarms every 5 time units, until
the whole system deadlocks because the temperature reaches
the threshold of 50 degrees.
Proposition 4. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2, and
Am be the attack defined in Example 3. Then,
• Sys ‖ Am v Sys , for m ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ Am vm+4..∞ Sys , for m > 8.
In this case, the IDS component of Sys is effective enough
to detect the attack with only one time unit delay.
Example 4. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to
the (controller of) sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(2..∞)]
such that C(Est?) = {2}, C(Est!) = 2..∞ and C(ι) = ∅, for
ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}:
A = idle.timeoutbread Est(x).B〈x〉c
B(y) = timeoutbwrite Est〈y〉.idle.B〈y〉cB〈y〉 .
Here, the attack A does the following actions in sequence: (i)
she sleeps for one time unit, (ii) in the following time slot, she
reads the current temperature v at sensor st, and (iii) for the
rest of her life, she keeps sending the same temperature v to
the controller of st. In the presence of this attack, the process
Ctrl never activates the Cooling component (and, hence, nor
the IDS component, which is the only one which could send an
alarm) as it will always detect a temperature below 10. Thus,
the compound system Sys ‖ A will move to an unsafe state
until the invariant will be violated and the system will deadlock.
Indeed, in the worst scenario, after d 9.91+δ e = d 9.91.4e = 8 idle-
actions (in the 9-th time slot) the value of temp will be above
9.9, and after further 5 idle-actions (in the 14-th time slot) the
system will violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe
action. After = d 501.4e = 36 idle-actions, in the 37-th time
slot, the invariant may be broken because the state variable
temp may reach 50.4 degrees, and the system will also emit a
deadlock action. Thus, Sys ‖ A v14..∞ Sys . This is a lethal
attack, as it causes a shut down of the system. It is also a
stealthy attack as it remains unnoticed until the end.
In this attack, the IDS component is completely ineffective
as the sensor used by the component is compromised, and
there is no way for the IDS to understand whether the sensor
is under attack. A more sophisticated IDS might have a
representation of the plant to recognise abnormal evolutions
of the sensed temperature. In such case, the IDS might
switch on a second sensor, hoping that this one has not been
compromised yet. Another possibility for the designer of the
CPS is to secure the sensor. Although this is not always possible,
as encryption/decryption of all packets depends on energy
constraints of the device.
Our semantics ensures that secured devices cannot be
attacked, as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let M = EonS P be an honest and sound CPS.
Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)], with {p : C(Ep?)∪C(Ep!) 6= ∅} ⊆ S .
Then M ‖ A vM , for any attack A of class C.
Now, let us examine a similar but less severe attack.
Example 5. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to
the controller of sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(1..n)], for
n > 0, with C(Est!) = C(Est?) = 1..n and C(ι) = ∅, for
ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}:
An = timeoutbread Est(x).timeoutb{write Est〈x−2〉.
idle.An−1cAn−1cAn−1
with A0 = nil. In this attack, for n consecutive time slots,
An sends to the controller the current sensed temperature
decreased by an offset 2. The effect of this attack on the system
depends on the duration n of the attack itself:
• for n ≤ 8, the attack is harmless as the variable temp
may not reach a (critical) temperature above 9.9;
• for n = 9, the variable temp might reach a temperature
above 9.9 in the 9-th time slot, and the attack would delay
the activation of the cooling system of one time slot; as
a consequence, the system might get into an unsafe state
in the time slots 14 and 15, but no alarm will be fired.
• for n ≥ 10, the system may get into an unsafe state in the
time slot 14 and in the following n − 7 time slots; this
is not a stealthy attack as the IDS will fire the alarm at
most two time slots later (in the 16-th time slot); this is
a temporary attack which ends in the time slot n+ 7.
Proposition 6. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2, and
An be the attack defined in Example 5. Then:
• Sys ‖ An v Sys , for n ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ An v14..15 Sys , for n = 9,
• Sys ‖ An v14..n+7 Sys , for n ≥ 10.
A. A technique for proving attack tolerance/vulnerability
In this subsection, we provide sufficient criteria to prove
attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C.
Actually, we do more than that: we provide sufficient criteria
to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of a class
C ′ that is somehow “weaker” than a given class C.
Definition 12. Let C1 ∈ [I → P(m1..n1)] and C2 ∈ [I →
P(m2..n2)] be two classes of attacks, with m1..n1 ⊆ m2..n2.
We say that C1 is weaker than C2, written C1  C2, if C1(ι) ⊆
C2(ι) for any ι ∈ I.
Intuitively, if C1  C2 then: (i) the attacks of class C1
might achieve fewer malicious activities than any attack of
class C2 (formally, there may be ι ∈ I such that C1(ι) = ∅ and
C2(ι) 6= ∅); (ii) for those malicious activities ι ∈ I achieved
by the attacks of both classes C1 and C2 (i.e., C1(ι) 6= ∅ and
C2(ι) 6= ∅), if they may be perpetrated by the attacks of class
C1 at some time slot k ∈ m1..n1 (i.e., k ∈ C1(ι)) then all
attacks of class C2 may do the same activity ι at the same
time k (i.e., k ∈ C2(ι)).
The next objective is to define a notion of most powerful
attack (also called top attacker) of a given class C, such that,
if a CPS M tolerates the most powerful attack of class C then
it also tolerates any attack of class C ′, with C ′  C. We will
provide a similar condition for attack vulnerability: let M be a
CPS vulnerable to Top(C) in the time interval m1..n1; then,
for any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C, if M is vulnerable
to A then it is so for a smaller time interval m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Our notion of top attacker has two extra ingredients with
respect to the cyber-physical attacks seen up to now: (i) non-
determinism, and (ii) time-unguarded recursive processes. This
extra power of the top attacker is not a problem as we are
looking for sufficient criteria.
For what concerns nondeterminism, we assume a generic pro-
cedure rnd() that given an arbitrary set Z returns an element of
Z chosen in a nondeterministic manner. This procedure allows
us to express nondeterministic choice, P⊕Q, as an abbreviation
for the process if (rnd({true, false})) {P} else {Q}. Thus, let
ι ∈ {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪ A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A}, m ∈ N+,
n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with m ≤ n, and T ⊆ m..n, we define the
attack process Att(ι, k, T ) as the attack which may achieve
the malicious activity ι, at the time slot k, and which tries to
do the same in all subsequent time slots of T . Formally,
Att(Ep?, k, T ) =
if (k ∈ T ) {(timeoutbread Ep?(x).Att(Ep?, k, T )c
Att(Ep?, k+1, T )) ⊕ idle.Att(Ep?, k+1, T )} else
if (k < sup(T )) {idle.Att(Ep?, k+1, T )} else {nil}
Att(Ep!, k, T ) =
if (k ∈ T ) {(timeoutbwrite Ep!〈rnd(R)〉.Att(Ep!, k, T )c
Att(Ep!, k+1, T )) ⊕ idle.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )} else
if (k < sup(T )) {idle.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )} else {nil} .
Note that for T = ∅ we assume sup(T ) = −∞.
We can now use the definition above to formalise the notion
of most powerful attack of a given class C.
Definition 13 (Top attacker). Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] be a
class of attacks. We define
Top(C) =
∏
ι∈I Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
as the most powerful attack, or top attacker, of class C.
The following theorem provides soundness criteria for attack
tolerance and attack vulnerability.
Theorem 1 (Soundness criteria). Let M be an honest and
sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of attacks, and A an attack
of a class C ′, with C ′  C.
• If M ‖ Top(C) v M then M ‖ A v M .
• If M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M then either M ‖ A vM or
M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Proof (sketch). The top attacker Top(C) can mimic any ex-
ecution trace of any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C (for
a formal proof of this statement we refer the reader to [16]).
Thus, if M ‖ A t−−→, for some trace t, then M ‖ Top(C) t−−→
as well.
For any M and A, either M ‖ A vM or M ‖ A vm2..n2
M , for some m2 and n2 (m2 = 1 and n2 = ∞ if the two
systems are completely unrelated). Suppose by contradiction
that M ‖ A 6v M and M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 6⊆
m1..n1. There are two cases: either n1 =∞ or n1 ∈ N+.
If n1 = ∞ then m2 < m1. Since M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , by
Definition 8 there is a trace t, with #idle(t) = m2−1, such
that M ‖ A t−−→ and M 6 tˆ==⇒. Since Top(C) can mimic any
execution trace of any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C,
this entails M ‖ Top(C) t−−→. Since M 6 tˆ==⇒ and #idle(t) =
m2−1 < m1, this contradicts M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M .
If n1 ∈ N+ then m2 < m1 and/or n1 < n2, and we reason
as in the previous case.
Corollary 1. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C a
class of attacks. If Top(C) is not lethal for M then any attack
A of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not a lethal attack for M . If
Top(C) is not a permanent attack for M then any attack A
of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not a permanent attack for M .
Remark 2. The reader may wonder about the scalability of
the verification method proposed in Theorem 1. We would like
to recall that in our companion paper [15] we developed
a (bi)simulation (pre)congruence for a simpler version of
the calculus where security features have been completely
stripped off. For simplicity, in the current paper, we adopted
as main behavioural semantics trace preorder instead of
simulation preorder. We believe that switching to a simulation
precongruence, preserved by parallel composition, would allow
us to scale our verification method to bigger systems (i.e.,
we believe that using simulation precongruence instead of
trace preorder would allow our verification method to enjoy
scalability “for free”). However, this will need to be checked
thoroughly in order to consider the more complex version of
the calculus with security features that we focus on here.
In the following, we provide a small example to explain how
Theorem 1 could be used to infer attack tolerance/vulnerability
with respect to an entire class of attacks.
Example 6. Consider the CPS Sys of Example 2 and a class of
attacks C, such that C(Est!) = C(Est?) = {13}, and C(ι) = ∅,
for ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}. Attacks of class C can read/tamper with
the sensor st (exclusively) in the time slot 13 (i.e., in the time
interval 13..13). In Proposition 7 we will show that:
• Top(C) may never lead the system Sys in deadlock,
• Top(C) may drag the system Sys in an unsafe state only
in the time interval 17..19 (no alarms are possible).
As a consequence, each attack of class C (or weaker than C)
cannot achieve more than that. Let us provide three different
attacks of classes weaker than or equal to C.
Consider the attack:
A1 = idle
12.timeoutbwrite Est〈11〉c .
This attack forces the activation of the cooling system without
any consequence to the observable behaviour of the whole
system (see Proposition 7). The attack belongs to a class C ′,
with C ′  C, such that C ′(Est!) = {13} and C ′(ι) = ∅, for
ι 6= Est!.
Consider a different attack:
A2 = idle
12.timeoutbwrite Est〈9〉c .
This attack is of the same class C ′. However, it may delay
the activation of the cooling system, and due to such delay
the CPS under attack may get into an unsafe state in the time
interval 17..19 (see Proposition 7).
Finally, consider the attack:
A3 = idle
12.timeoutbread Est(x).if (x=10.5)
{timeoutbwrite Est〈9〉c}c .
This is an attack of class C which delays the activation of the
cooling system as well; however, this delay may only occur
when the temperature is quite low. As a consequence, the system
under attack may get into an unsafe state only in the time slot
18, i.e., the time interval 18..18, (again, see Proposition 7).
The following proposition formalises the statements con-
tained in Example 6.
Proposition 7. Let Sys be the CPS of Example 2 and C be
a class of attacks such that C(Est!) = C(Est?) = {13}, and
C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}. Then,
• Sys ‖ Top(C) v17..19 Sys ,
• Sys ‖ A1 v Sys ,
• Sys ‖ A2 v17..19 Sys ,
• Sys ‖ A3 v18..18 Sys .
IV. IMPACT OF AN ATTACK
In the previous section, we have grouped cyber-physical
attacks by focussing on the physical devices under attack
and the timing aspects of the attack (Definition 10). Then,
we have provided a formalisation of when a CPS should be
considered tolerant/vulnerable to an attack (Definition 11). In
this section, we show that it is important not only to demonstrate
the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS with respect to certain
attacks, but also to evaluate the disruptive impact of those
attacks on the target CPS [9].
The goal of this section is thus twofold: to provide a metric
to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS, and to
investigate possible quantifications of the chances for an attack
of being successful when attacking a CPS.
As to the metric, we focus on the ability that an attack may
have to drag a CPS out of the correct behaviour modelled by
its evolution map, with the given uncertainty. Recall that evol
is monotone with respect to the uncertainty. Thus, an increase
of the uncertainty may translate into a widening of the range
of the possible behaviours of the CPS.
In the following, for M = EonS P , we write M [ψ ← ψ′]
to mean E[ψ ← ψ′]onS P .
Fig. 4. Simulation of Sys[δ ← 29
30
].
Proposition 8 (Monotonicity). Let M = EonS P be an honest
and sound CPS, and ξw the uncertainty of E. If ξw ≤ ξ′w and
M
t−−→M ′ then M [ξw ← ξ′w]
t−−→M ′[ξw ← ξ′w].
However, a wider uncertainty in the model doesn’t always
correspond to a widening of the possible behaviours of the
CPS. In fact, this depends on the intrinsic tolerance of a CPS
with respect to changes in the uncertainty function.
Definition 14 (System ξ-tolerance). An honest and sound CPS
M = EonS P , where ξw is the uncertainty of E, is ξ-tolerant,
for ξ ∈ RXˆ and ξ ≥ 0, if
ξ = sup
{
ξ′ : M [ξw ← ξw+η] vM, for any 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′
}
.
Intuitively, if a CPS M has been designed with a given
uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with ξ > 0,
then the uncertainty ξw is somehow underestimated: the real
uncertainty of M is given by ξw+ξ. This information is quite
important when trying to estimate the impact of an attack on
a CPS. In fact, if a system M has been designed with a given
uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with ξ > 0, then
an attack has (at least) a “room for manoeuvre” ξ to degrade
the whole CPS without being observed (and hence detected).
Let Sys be the CPS of Example 2. In the rest of the section,
with an abuse of notation, we will write Sys[δ ← γ] to denote
Sys where the uncertainty of the variable temp is γ.
Example 7. The CPS Sys of Example 2 is 120 -tolerant. This
is because sup
{
ξ′ : Sys[δ ← δ+η] v Sys, for 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′}
is equal to 120 . Since δ + ξ =
8
20 +
1
20 =
9
20 , the proof of this
statement relies on the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let Sys be the CPS of Example 2. Then:
• Sys[δ ← γ] v Sys , for γ ∈ ( 820 , 920 ),
• Sys[δ ← γ] 6v Sys , for γ > 920 .
Figure 4 shows an evolution of Sys[δ ← 2930 ]: the red box
denotes a violation of the safety conditions because the cooling
cycle wasn’t sufficient to drop the (sensed) temperature below
10 (here, the controller imposes 5 further time units of cooling).
Now everything is in place to define our metric to estimate
the impact of an attack.
Definition 15 (Impact). Let M = EonS P be an honest and
sound CPS, where ξw is the uncertainty of E. We say that an
attack A has definitive impact ξ on the system M if
ξ = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ ∈ RXˆ ∧ ξ′>0 ∧M ‖ A vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ′]
}
.
It has pointwise impact ξ on the system M at time m if
ξ= inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′∈RXˆ ∧M ‖ A vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′], n∈N∪{∞}
}
.
Intuitively, the impact of an attacker A on a system M
measures the uncertainty introduced by the presence of the
attacker in the compound system M ‖ A with respect to the
original system M .
With this definition, we can establish either the definitive
(and hence maximum) impact of the attack A on the system
M , or the impact at a specific time m. In the latter case,
by definition of vm..n, there are two possibilities: either the
impact of the attack keeps growing after time m, or in the
time interval m+1, the system under attack deadlocks.
The impact of Top(C) provides an upper bound for the
impact of all attacks of class C ′, with C ′  C.
Theorem 2 (Top attacker’s impact). Let M be an honest and
sound CPS, and C an arbitrary class of attacks. Let A be an
attack of class C ′, with C ′  C.
• The definitive impact of Top(C) on M is greater than or
equal to the definitive impact of A on M .
• If Top(C) has pointwise impact ξ on M at time m, and A
has pointwise impact ξ′ on M at time m′, with m′ ≤ m,
then ξ′ ≤ ξ.
Proof (sketch). Consider the case of the definitive impact. The
top attacker Top(C) can mimic any execution trace of any
attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C (for a formal proof of
this statement we refer the reader to [16]). As a consequence,
M ‖ A t−−→ entails M ‖ Top(C) t−−→. This implies M ‖
A vM ‖ Top(C). Thus, if M ‖ Top(C) vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ],
for ξ ∈ RXˆ , ξ > 0, then, by transitivity of v, it follows that
M ‖ A vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ].
The proof in the case of the pointwise impact is by
contradiction.
In order to provide more intuition about what the metrics
given in Definition 15 measure, we give a couple of examples.
Example 8. Let us consider the attack An of Example 5, for
n = 10. Then, A10 has a definitive impact of 730 to the CPS
Sys defined in Example 2. Formally,
7
30
= inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ‖ A10 v Sys[δ ← δ + ξ′]
}
.
Here, the attack may drag the system into an unsafe state during
the time interval 14..17 (temporary attack). As the attack can
affect the system for only 4 time slots, its impact is relatively
low: the temperature may rise of at most 1.63 degrees per time
slot, instead of 1.4.
Technically, since δ + ξ = 1230 +
7
30 =
19
30 , the proof of what
stated in this example relies on the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2,
and A10 be the attack defined in Example 8. Then:
• Sys ‖ A10 6v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ ∈ ( 1230 , 1930 ),
• Sys ‖ A10 v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ > 1930 .
The following example shows that the attack provided in
Example 4 has much stronger impact on the CPS Sys .
Example 9. Let us consider the attack A of Example 4. As
this attack prevents the activation of the cooling system, the
temperature will keep growing until the CPS Sys gets into an
unsafe state and eventually deadlocks. This is a stealthy lethal
attack that has a very severe and high impact. In fact, it has
a definitive impact of 8.5 on the CPS Sys . Formally,
8.5 = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ‖ A v Sys[δ ← δ+ξ′]}.
Intuitively, in order to deadlock the system without being
noticed, the attack must induce a rapid increase of the
temperature: 9.9 degrees per time slot, instead of 1.4.
Technically, since δ+ξ = 0.4+8.5 = 8.9, the proof of what
is stated in this example relies on the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2,
and A be the attack defined in Example 9. Then:
• Sys ‖ A 6v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 8.9),
• Sys ‖ A v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ > 8.9.
Definition 15 provided an instrument to estimate the impact
of a successful attack. However, there is at least another
question that a CPS designer could ask: “Is there a way to
estimate the chances that an attack will be successful during
the execution of my CPS?” To paraphrase in a more operational
manner: how many execution traces of my CPS are prone to
be attacked by a specific attack?
For instance, consider again the simple attack Am proposed
in Example 3:
idlem−1.timeoutbread Ecool(x).if (x=off) {write Ecool〈off〉}c.
Here, in the m-th time slot the attack drops a command to
turn on the cooling. The attack is very quick and condensed
in a single time slot. The question is: what are the chances of
success of such a quick attack?
Figure 5 provides a representation of an experiment in
MATLAB where we launched 10000 executions of our CPS in
isolation, lasting 700 time units each. From the aggregated data
contained in this graphic, we note that after a transitory phase
(whose length depends on several things: the uncertainty δ, the
initial state of the system, the length of the cooling activity,
etc.) that lasts around 300 time slots, the rate of success of
the attack Am is around 10%. The reader may wonder why
exactly the 10%. This depends on the periodicity of our CPS,
as in average the cooling is activated every 10 time slots.
This example shows that, as pointed out in [10], the effec-
tiveness of a cyber-physical attack depends on the information
the attack has about the functionality of the whole CPS. For
instance, if the attacker were not aware of the exact periodicity
of the CPS, she might try, if possible, to repeat the attack on
Fig. 5. A quantitative analysis of the attack of Example 3.
more consecutive time slots. In this case, the left graphic of
Figure 6 says that the rate of success of the attack increases
linearly with the length of the attack itself (data obtained by
attacking the CPS after the transitory period). Thus, if the
attack of Example 3 were iterated for 10 time slots, say
A10m = idle
m−1.B10
Bi = timeoutbread Ecool(x).if (x = off)
{write Ecool〈off〉.idle.Bi−1}cBi−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10
with B0 = nil, the rate of success would be almost 100%.
Finally, consider a generalisation of the attack of Example 5:
Ak0 = nil
Akn = timeoutbread Est(x).timeoutbwrite Est〈x−k〉.
idle.Akn−1cAkn−1cAkn−1
for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 and 2 ≤ k ≤ 10. Here, the attack decreases
the sensed temperature of an offset k. Now, suppose to launch
this attack after, say, 300 time slots (i.e., after the transitory
phase). Formally, we define the attack: Bkn = idle
300.Akn. In
this case, the right graphic of Figure 6 provides a graphical
representation of the percentage of alarms on 5000 execution
traces lasting 100 time units each. Thus, for instance, an attack
lasting n = 8 time units with an offset k = 5 affects around
40% of the execution traces of the CPS.
These two examples show that our notion of impact might be
refined by taking into account quantitative aspects of an attack
such as the probability of being successful when targeting a
specific CPS. This would require a probabilistic extension of
our approach, which we will investigate in future work.
V. CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided formal theoretical foundations to reason
about, and statically detect, attacks to physical devices of CPSs.
To that end, we have proposed a hybrid process calculus, called
CCPSA, as a formal specification language to model physical
and cyber components of CPSs as well as cyber-physical attacks.
Based on CCPSA and its labelled transition semantics, we
have formalised a threat model for CPSs by grouping attacks
in classes, according to the target physical devices and two
timing parameters: begin and duration of the attacks. Then,
Fig. 6. A quantitative analysis of two different attacks.
we relied on the trace semantics of CCPSA to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack. Along
the lines of GNDC [7], we defined a notion of top attacker,
Top(C), of a given class of attacks C, which has been used to
provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability
to all attacks of class C (and weaker ones). As we remarked
above, we believe that we could switch to a (bi)simulation
semantics, preserved by parallel composition, which would in
turn allow us to scale Theorem 1 and, more generally, our
approach to bigger systems, but this will require a thorough
investigation. Finally, we have provided a metric to estimate
the impact of a successful attack on a CPS together with
possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack.
We proved that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C)
represents an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of
class C (and weaker ones).
Related work: A number of approaches have been proposed
for modelling CPSs using hybrid process algebras [5], [2], [24],
[8]. CCPSA shares some similarities with the φ-calculus [24].
However, unlike CCPSA, in the φ-calculus, given a hybrid
system (E,P ), the process P can dynamically change the
evolution law in E. Furthermore, the φ-calculus does not have a
representation of physical devices and measurement law, which
are instead crucial for us to model cyber-physical attacks that
operate in a timely fashion on sensors and actuators.
Among the 118 papers discussed in the comprehensive
survey [31], 50 adopt a discrete notion of time similar to ours,
13 a continuous one, 48 a quasi-static time model, and the
rest use a hybrid time model. Most of these papers investigate
attacks on CPSs and their protection by relying on simulation
test systems to validate the results.
We focus on the papers that are most closely related to
our work. Huang et al. [12] were among the first to propose
threat models for CPSs. Along with [13], [14], they stressed
the role played by timing parameters on integrity and DoS
attacks. Alternative threat models are discussed in [9], [10],
[26]. In particular, Gollmann et al. [10] discussed possible goals
(equipment damage, production damage, compliance violation)
and stages (access, discovery, control, damage, cleanup) of
cyber-physical attacks. In the current paper, we focused on the
damage stage, where the attacker already has a rough idea of
the plant and the control architecture of the target CPS.
A few works use formal methods for CPS security, although
they apply methods, and most of the time have goals, that are
quite different from ours.
Burmester et al. [3] employed hybrid timed automata to
give a threat framework based on the traditional Byzantine
faults model for crypto-security. However, as remarked in [26],
cyber-physical attacks and faults have inherently distinct
characteristics. Faults are considered as physical events that
affect the system behaviour, where simultaneous events don’t
act in a coordinated way; cyber-attacks may be performed over
a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In [28], Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses
some of the peculiarities of a cyber-physical adversary, and
discussed how this scenario relates to other attack models
popular in the security protocol literature. Then, in [29], [30]
Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting
processes equipped with notions of failed and unwanted
communication. These works differ quite considerably from
ours, e.g., they focus on DoS attacks without taking into
consideration timing aspects or impact of the attack.
Cómbita et al. [4] and Zhu and Basar [32] applied game
theory to capture the conflict of goals between an attacker who
seeks to maximise the damage inflicted to a CPS’s security
and a defender who aims to minimise it [19].
Finally, there are three recent papers that were developed in
parallel to ours: [20], [23], [22]. Rocchetto and Tippenhaur [23]
introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker models proposed
for CPS security and outline requirements for generalised
attacker models; in [22], they then proposed an extended
Dolev-Yao attacker model suitable for CPSs. In their approach,
physical layer interactions are modelled as abstract interactions
between logical components to support reasoning on the
physical-layer security of CPSs. This is done by introducing
additional orthogonal channels. Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [20] work around the notion of Timed Dolev-
Yao Intruder Models for Cyber-Physical Security Protocols by
bounding the number of intruders required for the automated
verification of such protocols. Following a tradition in security
protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the question: How
many intruders are enough for verification and where should
they be placed? They also extend the strand space model to
CPS protocols by allowing for the symbolic representation of
time, so that they can use the tool Maude [21] along with SMT
support. Their notion of time is however different from ours,
as they focus on the time a message needs to travel from an
agent to another. The paper does not mention physical devices,
such as sensors and/or actuators.
Future work: While much is still to be done, we believe
that our paper provides a stepping stone for the development
of formal and automated tools to analyse the security of CPSs.
We will consider applying, possibly after proper enhancements,
existing tools and frameworks for automated security protocol
analysis, resorting to the development of a dedicated tool if
existing ones prove not up to the task. We will also consider
further security properties and concrete examples of CPSs, as
well as other kinds of cyber-physical attackers and attacks,
e.g., periodic attacks. This will allow us to refine the classes
of attacks we have given here (e.g., by formalising a type
system amenable to static analysis), and provide a formal
definition of when a CPS is more secure than another so as to
be able to design, by progressive refinement, secure variants
of a vulnerable CPSs.
We also aim to extend the preliminary quantitative analysis
we have given here by developing a suitable behavioural theory
ensuring that our trace semantics considers also the probability
of a trace to actually occur. We expect that weak simulation
quasimetrics [17] will be useful to that extent.
Finally, for what concerns automatic approximations of the
impact, while we have not yet fully investigated the problem,
we believe that we can transform it into a “minimum problem”.
For instance, if the environment uses linear functions, then, by
adapting techniques developed for linear hybrid automata (see,
e.g., [1]), the set of all traces with length at most n (for a fixed
n) can be characterised by a system of first degree inequalities,
so the measure of the impact could be translated into a linear
programming problem.
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